Sequential information disclosure in auctions

On the Drawbacks of Sequential Auctions for Multiple Objects with Aysmmetric Bidder

Sequential first price auctions of multiple lots are very common in procurement, electricity, tobacco, timber, and oil lease. Presumably, they are common because they are easier to organize to than simultaneous ones. In this paper we identify two ways in which a sequential format may facilitate collusion among bidders relative to a simultaneous one, and we analyze the seller’s disclosure polici...

Three Essays on Auctions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING . . . . . . . . . 3 ...

Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment∗

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses information about quality in wholesale automobile auctions. As the theoretical literature predicts, information disclosure increases expected revenues. However, in contrast with convent...

The Collusive Drawbacks of Sequential Auctions

Sequential first-price auctions for multiple objects are very common in procurement, electricity, tobacco, timber, and oil lease markets. In this paper we identify two ways in which a sequential format may facilitate collusion among bidders relative to a simultaneous one. The first effect relates to the cartel’s ability to identify and punish defectors within the sequence, thus lowering the gai...

Essays on Information Disclosure in Auctions and Contests