Expressivism about Reference and Quantification over the Non - Existent without
نویسنده
چکیده
Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. Let’s say we propose that, as appearances suggest, names like Pegasus refer to non-existent things. They are not, in other words, empty names, names without referents. Rather, they are terms that refer, and so have referents, but the referents do not exist. Moreover, at least prima facie, we can affirm claims like:
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