Pragmatism and the untenable dualism of means and ends: Why rational choice theory does not deserve paradigmatic privilege

Even as rational choice theory is increasingly used in sociology, ¢nding its way into such diverse subdisciplines as the sociology of the family, religion, gender, crime, race, strati¢cation, and economic sociology, it remains hotly contested. It has spurred a rancorous debate that, at its worst, ‘‘degenerates into a caricatured contrast between a cold and calculating egoist engaged at the breakfast table in a cost-bene¢t assessment of the value of continuing his/her marriage and an oversocialized goody-two-shoes programmed in early childhood to cherish the values and conform to the norms that sustain the social order by serving the common good.’’ Nevertheless, most of the numerous and contentious salvos ¢red by the theory’s detractors do little damage. From even a cursory reading of papers speci¢cally on the merits and demerits of rational choice theory ^ including important symposia in The American Sociologist (1997) and the American Journal of Sociology (1998) ^ it is clear that its proponents believe that, even when largely accepted, the standard criticisms do not undermine rational choice models of human behavior. I contend that much conventional sociological critique of rational choice theory is inherently unable to remove that theory’s ‘‘paradigmatic privilege’’ because both sides of the debate implicitly accept what Barry Hindess calls the ‘‘portfolio’’ model of the actor, in which individuals carry a relatively stable and pre-existing set of beliefs and desires from context to context. Given the situation, they select from this portfolio ‘‘those elements that seem relevant and [use] them to decide on a course of action.’’ The seemingly universal conception of an actor with a well-de¢ned set of goals pushes William Goode to equate all purposive action with ‘‘rational choice’’ and make the ‘‘surely surprising assertion that it is nearly impossible for us to develop a body of social action theory that is not ultimately and fundamentally a rational action theory.’’