Dynamics in Games
نویسنده
چکیده
The purpose of the course is to study several dynamics generated by strategic interactions in games. Among the topics are adaptive dynamics in evolutionary game theory, robust procedures for on-line algorithms and stochastic approximation. 1. Fictitious play Discrete time Continuous time and best reply dynamics 2. Replicator dynamics n populations One population Evolutionary Stable Strategies 3. Other global dynamics Nash fields Examples 4. Approachability Blackwell’ s theory Potential approach 5. Consistency regret-based procedures Smooth fictitious play 6. Applications Consistency and correlation Calibrating Appendix Differential inclusions Dynamical systems for differential inclusions Stochastic approximation for differential inclusions
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