A response to Beauchamp.

Tom Beauchamp's article summarizes the assertions of and case for what is now called "principlism" (an unfortunate term of art). I believe Professor Beauchamp is correct that much of the criticism levied against the view articulated in Principles of Biomedical Ethics is inaccurate. Contrary to criticism that Principles of Biomedical Ethics stands for the proposition that principles are an insufficient characterization of moral reasoning, the authors believe principles are a crucial, indeed a necessary portion of morality, no more; the authors clearly never claim the sufficiency of principles. Professor Beauchamp is right to make this claim, and right to say that, for all practical purposes, there is a plurality of principles which may compete and that human tragedy arises as we try to live amid these conflicts. Sometimes I get the feeling the argument for high theory arises from a desire to transcend these tragic conflicts and to find a way of saying that a given hard choice was not so difficult after all: one did the right thing and the attendant evil can be dismissed. But it would be dull if all I said was bravo. So I will briefly record some of my uncertainties about the approach of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Broadly speaking, these take the form of noting omissions or things deemphasized. For as catholic and open as the approach is, it cannot, ultimately, serve all masters. I put no particular weight on the order in which I make my points. First, Professor Beauchamp explicitly rejects the critics' appeal to a superprinciple beyond the practical principles of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. I believe the critics also must reject the appeal to a super principle to sustain the joint venture, as they would not be able to agree on what that superprinciple is. But beyond this entirely respectable practical consideration, Beauchamp produces a theoretical rationale: He seems to think that acceptance of such a principle would lead to an overly dogmatic, restrictive, and inflexible ethic. My inclination is to say a super-principle or greater background theory would help defend principlism against the charges of Conservatism or captivity to trend intuitions, charges Professor Beauchamp makes against casuistry which could be levied against his own theory. In any event, it is not clear that acknowledgment of a super-principle or other considerations beyond the mantra has to have the unfortunate characteristics to which Tom alludes in his conclusion. The fact that those are serious criticisms of Gert's moral theory tells only against Gert,