Information aggregation and investment cycles with strategic complementarity
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies the interaction between information aggregation and investment cycles with investments exhibiting strategic complementarity. The composition of information aggregation varies across different phases of cycles, which in turn affects the course of investment cycles. The phases of cycles are history dependent for informational reasons, and changes in phases depend on the growth rate of aggregate investment: a slowdown in growth is interpreted as bad news and a slowdown in downturn is considered as good news. A small structural change in low cost investments can have a large effect on the pattern of cycles. Investment cycles might be characterized by sudden crashes and slow recoveries.
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