Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction
نویسندگان
چکیده
Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert and the agents’ information is correlated. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficiency and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational. JEL Classification: D44, D82
منابع مشابه
Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
It is well-known that when agents’ types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents’ types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessar...
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