Legislative bargaining with teams
نویسندگان
چکیده
We experimentally investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with two player teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions (MECs) significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins norm. Teams have significantly more proposer power, and come significantly closer to the SSPE prediction. This results from proposers capturing almost all the money going to redundant voters, in conjunction with teams forming significantly more MWCs. A little over seventy percent of all teams discuss forming MWCs in the dry run or in the first
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 93 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015