God is not in the Mirror

In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and our closest living relatives, however, we can produce only admittedly speculative hunches as to the unique adaptive functioning of the neuroanatomical regions in question. However, it is worth pointing out that there are considerable morphological differences between humans and chimpanzees in precisely the area of the brain that is presumed responsible for allowing the attribution of mental states. The human prefrontal cortex has expanded substantially over the past 5-8 million years, is signiŽ cantly larger than homologous structures of the African great apes, and occupies more of the cerebral mantle (Povinelli