Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance. keywords: Queueing Problems, Strategy-Proofness, Anonymity in welfare, Efficiency JEL Classification numbers: D63, D71 ∗Corresponding address: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN. E-mail: [email protected] †JSPS Research Fellow. Corresponding address: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, JAPAN. E-mail: [email protected]