Voting power and Qualified Majority Voting with a “no vote” option
نویسنده
چکیده
In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has led to increased interest in the allocation of voting weights to member states with hugely differing population numbers. While the eventually agreed voting scheme lacks any strict mathematical basis, the Polish government suggested a voting scheme based on the Penrose definition of voting power, leading to an allocation of voting weights proportional to the square root of the population (the “Jagiellonian Compromise”). The Penrose definition of voting power is derived from the citizens’ freedom to vote either “yes” or “no”. This paper defines a corresponding voting power based on “yes”, “no” and “abstain” options, and it is found that this definition also leads to a square root law, and to the same optimal vote allocation as the Penrose scheme.
منابع مشابه
What Is a Fair Distribution of Power
Voting in the EU-Council – a brief sketch At least since the EU-summit in Nice in December 2000 there has been an intensive discussion about the voting procedure in the EU-Council. The Treaty of Nice contains a very complicated procedure which consists of three voting criteria. A proposal is accepted by the Council if: 1) the (simple) majority of states support the proposal 2) the proposal rece...
متن کاملStrategic Voting Experiments
We report preliminary results from voting experiments designed to test both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic models of strategic voting. The experiments used a qualified majority voting system in which either of two options required a two-thirds majority to win, and thus for all participants to receive a positive payoff. Since the payoffs varied across the electorate, there were opportunit...
متن کاملStrategic Voting under the Qualified Majority Rule
This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...
متن کاملSelf-attenuating Strategic Voting
This is an analysis of strategic voting under qualified majority voting. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict complete coordination of strategic voting: a strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of popular ...
متن کاملA New Theory of Strategic Voting
Existing game-theoretic analysis of plurality rule elections predicts the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. I reach a different conclusion. A group of voters must partially coordinate behind one of two challenging candidates in order to avoid the success of a disliked incumbent. Departing from existing models, the popular support for each chal...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008