Adverse Selection in the Children’s Health Insurance Program
نویسندگان
چکیده
This study investigates whether new enrollees in the Alabama Children's Health Insurance Program have different claims experience from renewing enrollees who do not have a lapse in coverage and from continuing enrollees. The analysis compared health services utilization in the first month of enrollment for new enrollees (who had not been in the program for at least 12 months) with utilization among continuing enrollees. A second analysis compared first-month utilization of those who renew immediately with those who waited at least 2 months to renew. A 2-part model estimated the probability of usage and then the extent of usage conditional on any utilization. Claims data for 826 866 child-years over the period from 1999 to 2012 were used. New enrollees annually constituted a stable 40% share of participants. Among those enrolled in the program, 13.5% renewed on time and 86.5% of enrollees were late to renew their enrollment. In the multivariate 2-part models, controlling for age, gender, race, income eligibility category, and year, new enrollees had overall first-month claims experience that was nearly $29 less than continuing enrollees. This was driven by lower ambulatory use. Late renewals had overall first-month claims experience that was $10 less than immediate renewals. However, controlling for the presence of chronic health conditions, there was no statistically meaningful difference in the first-month claims experience of late and early renewals. Thus, differences in claims experience between new and continuing enrollees and between early and late renewals are small, with greater spending found among continuing and early renewing participants. Higher claims experience by early renewals is attributable to having chronic health conditions.
منابع مشابه
Health insurance reform: The impact of a Medicare buy-in
The steady-state general equilibrium and welfare consequences of a Medicare buy-in program, optional for those aged 55–64, is evaluated in a calibrated life-cycle economy with incomplete markets. Incomplete markets and adverse selection create a potential welfare improving role for health insurance reform. We find that adverse selection eliminates any market for a Medicare buy-in if it is offer...
متن کاملWho enrolled in a state program for the uninsured: was there adverse selection?
Managed care plans may hesitate to participate in programs for uninsured persons because they fear adverse selection, whereby only the sickest people or highest users would choose to join the program. We studied this issue in Washington State's Basic Health Plan, a demonstration program that provides subsidized health insurance for families earning less than 200% of the poverty level. We interv...
متن کاملChapter 3 Intra - Household Allocations of Micro Health Insurance : No Adverse Selection After All ?
This chapter analyzes adverse selection in micro health insurance. Health insurance is typically family-based to limit adverse selection within households. I investigate whether such selection occurs empirically, using the case of an individual-based micro health insurance program in rural Nigeria. The empirical analysis applies two-sample two-stage least squares and uses household fixed e↵ects...
متن کاملEliminating Barriers to Enrollment in the Children’s Health Insurance Program
In 1997, Congress authorized the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP or CHIP) to decrease the number of uninsured children in the United States. By September 1999 all states had submitted their CHIP plans to and received approval from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Yet, in spite of ambitious efforts on the part of many states to assemble their CHIP programs quick...
متن کاملHow are CHIPRA quality demonstration States using quality reports to drive heatlh care improvements for children? Evaluation Highlight No. 11
Demonstration Grant Program In February 2010, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded 10 grants, funding 18 States, to improve the quality of health care for children enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Funded by the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), the Quality Demonstration Grant Program aims to id...
متن کاملHow did CHIPRA quality demonstration States employ learning collaboratives to improve children's health quality? Evaluation Highlight #13
Demonstration Grant Program In February 2010, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded 10 grants, funding 18 States, to improve the quality of health care for children enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Funded by the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), the Quality Demonstration Grant Program aims to id...
متن کامل