How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-motives on the Macro-level

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical model of " normative conflict " and explain how transaction failures on the macrolevel can result from cooperative motives on the microlevel. We differentiate between two kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations regarding the way in which general normative obligations should be fulfilled, the second from distinct expectations as to how the norm should restrain actions based on self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in a version of the ultimatum game. Our data reveal widespread normative conflict among different types of actors – egoistic, equity, equality and cherry picker. Our findings demonstrate how cooperative intentions about how to divide a collectively produced good may fail to produce cooperative outcomes. Why is it that people consider our behavior improper despite our best intentions? Should norm adherence not prevent us from running into conflict? For example, why is it that well-intentioned, expensive presents are often rejected? For what reason is the offer of a seat on a bus angrily rejected by a sprightly elderly person? How to explain that getting " straight to the point " in a business meeting is often perceived as unmannerly? These everyday occurrences are puzzling given that norms of behavior are generally regarded as cohesive. Even scholars of opposing schools of thought seem to converge around the idea that social norms emerge because they have positive consequences for society. In the functionalist approach, norms bridge the tension between individual self-interest and the functional prerequisites of society (Durkheim 1997[1897]; Parsons 1937; Dahrendorf 1958). The rational choice literature studies conditions under which individuals will overcome their self-interest in order to contribute to as well as four anonymous referees and two editors. We are indebted to Isabel Kuroczka and Jana Adler for research assistance, the University of Leipzig for providing the experimental infrastructure and the ETH Zürich for funding the study. FW introduced the idea to study normative conflict and conducted the experiment. FW and HR elaborated the concept of normative conflict, analyzed the data, performed the game theoretical analysis of normative conflict, and wrote the manuscript. DH supervised the study, …