Security Analysis of Cryptosystems Using Short Generators over Ideal Lattices

In this paper, we analyze the security of cryptosystems using short generators over ideal lattices such as candidate multilinear maps by Garg, Gentry and Halevi and fully homomorphic encryption by Smart and Vercauteren. Our approach is based on a recent work by Cramer, Ducas, Peikert and Regev on analysis of recovering a short generator of an ideal in the q-th cyclotomic field for a prime power q. In their analysis, implicit lower bounds of the special values of Dirichlet L-functions at 1 are essentially used for estimating some sizes of the dual basis in the log-unit lattice of the q-th cyclotomic field. Our main contribution is to improve Cramer et al.’s analysis by giving explicit lower and upper bounds of the special values of Dirichlet Lfunctions at 1 for any non-trivial even Dirichlet characters modulo q. Moreover, we give various experimental evidence that recovering short generators of principle ideals in 2-th cyclotomic fields for k ≥ 10 is succeeded with high probability. As a consequence, our analysis suggests that the security of the above cryptosystems based on the difficulty of recovering a short generator is reduced to solving the principal ideal problem under the number theoretical conjecture so-called Weber’s class number problem.