Solow meets Shapley
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a Solow-type growth model without constant returns. The population is heterogeneous with respect to capital per head, rate of saving, depreciation, and growth. We employ a continuous version of the Shapley value to divide total output among the di¤erent groups. In contrast to the standard Solow model, or its endogenous growth manifestation (labelled AK-type growth models), there may be multiple steady states. Keywords: Solow model; Growth theory; Shapley value; Constant returns to scale; Increasing returns to scale; Multiple steady states JEL-Classi cation: D33; D51; E25; C71; O40 Corresponding author: University of Leipzig, Postfach 920, 04009 Leipzig, Germany, tel.: 49 341 97 33 771, fax: 49 341 97 33 779, e-mail: [email protected]
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