Bargaining with Commitment under an uncertain Deadline
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IGTR
دوره 8 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006