Constructing Efficient Equilibria in Games Played Through Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
For the game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents discussed by Prat and Rustichini (2003), we construct a general set of equilibrium transfers which implement any efficient outcome as a weakly truthful equilibrium, and the subset of such equilibria that are Pareto optimal for the principals. We provide conditions under which the general set completely characterizes the set of all weakly truthful equilibria implementing a given efficient outcome. In addition, we show that as long as payoffs are concave any efficient outcome can be implemented with principals using affine strategies. JEL-Classification: C72, D62, L14, L24.
منابع مشابه
Games Played through Agents
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