When Samuelson Met Veblen Abroad: National and Global Public Good Provision when Social Comparisons Matter
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper derives Pareto efficient policy rules for the provision of national as well as global public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about relative consumption within as well as between countries. Furthermore, we compare these policy rules with those that follow from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The results show that both global and national public goods are systematically under-provided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns.
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