Good science? We should all be asking

Objectivity is a central tenet of the scientific process. That is, in order for science to be a successful tool for understanding the nature of reality it must be free from bias. This idea is so core to science that cases of explicit bias (e.g., data fabrication and false reporting of results) are both mystifying and sensational. In principle and (we hope) in practice, instances of bias can be detected and corrected through the scientific process itself (e.g., replication). Other forms of researcher biases (e.g., expectancy effects, confirmation bias) can also plague science; additional safeguards are employed tomitigate these effects, such as double blind study designs or coders who are blind to condition or study hypothesis. Still other protections are in place at the publication level with double-blind review processes, in which both reviewers and author(s) are anonymous to each other, although this practice is not uniform across scientific disciplines. Clearly, scientists are committed to rooting out bias, whether intended or not, in order to uphold the objectivity of the scientific process. In this vein, Medin and Bang argue in their book, Who's Asking? Native Science, Western Science, and Science Education, that it is crucial to consider who is and, perhaps more importantly, who is not engaging in science, and the consequences this may have on scientific understanding and science education. Central to their concern is the idea that, “culture and cultural values affect what problems scientists choose to study and how they choose to study them” (p. 162). This book can therefore be understood as a wake-up call to a threat to objectivity in science that may not be fully recognized or appreciated. Because scientists engage in the scientific process, which is value-free, there is a perception that science is also neutral. But, as Medin and Bang argue, science is not neutral because the questions asked reflect the scientist's (or their culture's) way of seeing the world. Therefore, in order for science to more accurately and completely describe the nature of reality (i.e., to decrease the threat to objectivity), greater diversity among scientists, which presumably entails greater diversity of worldviews and values, is needed. In developing the above argument, Medin and Bang provide a wideranging analysis of the history of science, philosophy of science, reductionism, the unity of science, and evidence and implications of values in science. Their conclusion is that the predominant scientific worldview comes from a Western perspective that more accurately reflects “Western science” than “science,” much in the way that research with U.S. undergraduate students does not generalize to all people (for a review, see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Instead for effective science, Medin and Bang argue for plurality of worldviews in scientific approaches and levels of analysis. As others have argued (e.g., Bauer, 1992), the scientific method is not a uniform process; rather the application of the scientific method depends upon the discipline and the questions asked. In other words, there is not just oneway to do science.