Lifecycle marriage matching: Theory and evidence∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
The marriage market is a dynamic bilateral matching market with finitely lived participants. The growth rate of the number of marriages between two types of individuals estimates the systematic benefit to them delaying marriage for a period versus marrying immediately. Identification of the semi-parametric model is transparent. The model is estimated with 1990 US marriage data. The estimated model shows that a concern for accumulating marriage specific capital is quantitatively significant in generating positive assortative matching in spousal ages at marriage, gender differences in spousal ages at marriage, and a preference for early marriage. Gender variations in population supplies due to gender specific mortality rates and entry cohort sizes have offsetting quantitative
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