Backwards-induction Outcome in a Quantum Game
نویسنده
چکیده
In economics duopoly is a market dominated by two firms large enough to influence the market price. Stackelberg presented a dynamic form of duopoly that is also called ‘leader-follower’ model. We give a quantum perspective on Stackelberg duopoly that gives a backwards-induction outcome same as the Nash equilibrium in static form of duopoly also known as Cournot’s duopoly. We find two qubit quantum pure states required for this purpose. PACS: 03.67.Lx 02.50.Le 87.23.Kg
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nt - p h / 01 11 09 0 v 2 1 4 Ja n 20 02 Backwards - induction outcome in a quantum game
In economics duopoly is a market dominated by two firms large enough to influence the market price. Stackelberg presented a dynamic form of duopoly that is also called 'leader-follower' model. We give a quantum perspective on Stackelberg duopoly that gives a backwards-induction outcome same as the Nash equilibrium in static form of duopoly also known as Cournot's duopoly. We find two qubit quan...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009