Identical Quantum Particles and Weak

We examine a recent argument that " identical " quantum particles with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black's spheres, for example). We conclude that the argument uses a silent premise that is not justified in the quantum case. 1 Individuality Objects are individuals. One might think of their individuality as something primitive, or as grounded in a metaphysical principle not accessible to science—but here we shall not consider such haecceistic conceptions. We take as our starting point that entities must differ in their qualitative features , described by the relevant scientific theory, in order to be treated as different objects. This is in the spirit of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII). At first sight it may seem that PII cannot function as a general basis for individuality, since it does not do justice to cases with several objects in a symmetrical configuration. Think of Max Black's spheres, of identical composition and two miles apart in a relational space (` a la Leibniz, not in Newtonian absolute space where absolute positions could label the spheres); Kant's enantiomorphic hands; or, for a mathematical example, the points in 1