Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The equilibrium concept fits well situations where each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than those of the right and left candidates. JEL classification: C7, D72.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003