The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge

Philosophers and social scientists have often argued (both implicitly and explicitly) that rational individuals can form irrational groups, and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as together they imply that prescriptions for individual and group decision-making respectively are logically independent of one another. In the context of science, the Independence Thesis is the assertion that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent, and in recent years, this thesis has been defended in various forms. Individuals who desire credit more than truth may divide “cognitive labor” across competing research programs better than do truth-seeking scientists, thereby inadvertently improving the scientific community’s chances of discovering truths (Kitcher, 1993; Goldman, 1992; Strevens, 2003). Individuals who refuse to abandon their favored theory, even in light of strong evidence against it, may help to make sure good theories are not prematurely abandoned by the broader scientific community (Feyerabend, 1965, 1968; Popper, 1975; Hull, 1988; Kuhn, 1977; Zollman, 2010). Groups composed of a random assortment of problem solvers may outperform a group of the individually best problem solvers (Hong and Page, 2001, 2004). Unreliable individuals might pool their information in such a way as to create reliable groups (Surowiecki, 2004; Goodin, 2006). Groups where a significant