The coalition structure core is accessible

نویسندگان

  • László Á. Kóczy
  • Luc Lauwers
چکیده

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation which we call enforceable dominance is employed.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 48  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2004