Understanding and Improving Incentives in Private P2P Communities

نویسندگان

  • Zhengye Liu
  • Prithula Dhungel
  • Di Wu
  • Chao Zhang
  • Keith W. Ross
چکیده

Incentive mechanisms play a critical role in P2P systems. Private BitTorrent sites use a novel incentive paradigm, where the sites record upload and download amounts of users and require each user to maintain its upload-to-download ratio above a specified threshold. This paper explores in-depth incentives in private P2P file-sharing systems. Our contributions are threefold. We first conduct a measurement study on a representative private BitTorrent site, examining how incentives influence user behavior. Our measurement study shows that, as compared with public torrents, a private BitTorrent site provides more incentive for users to contribute and seed. Second, we develop a game theoretic model and analytically show that the ratio mechanism indeed provides effective incentives. But existing ratio incentives in private BitTorrent sites are vulnerable to collusions. Third, to prevent collusion, we propose an upload entropy scheme, and show through analysis and experiment that the entropy scheme successfully limits colluding, while rarely affecting normal users who do not collude.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

On the sustainability of credit-based P2P communities

Evidences show that besides their incredible performance, private BitTorrent communities which employ credit-based contribution incentives can also confront with system seize-up. Although the sustainability of these communities can be established in a wide range of system parameters, it is still not fully understood under what initial conditions can this be assured. In this paper, with the usag...

متن کامل

Analysing the Security of Incentive Schemes in P2P-based File-sharing Systems

For Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file-sharing services cooperation is essential. However, peers behave rationally and try to maximise their benefits, while minimising their effort. To increase system performance incentive schemes are used to enforce cooperation. Nonetheless, so called free-riders and malicious peers try to attack these incentive schemes. In this paper we will first explain two popular P2...

متن کامل

Credible Reputation Systems for P2P e-Communities

Reputation mechanisms for distributed e-Communities are vital tools for facilitating trust decisions regarding transactions between entities. Motivated by the current challenges in the area of P2P reputation systems regarding their desgign, credibilty enhancement and objective evaluation, in this thesis we worked towards (1) creating a framework for the development and evaluation of secure repu...

متن کامل

Self-organised virtual communities: bridging the gap between web-based communities and P2P systems

In this paper we argue for the benefits of enabling the self-organization of virtual on-line communities, which today are mainly formed and operated by centrally managed web servers. However, self-organization requires community members to contribute themselves different types of resources (e.g. bandwidth, storage, etc.), as in the case of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Unfortunately, this coopera...

متن کامل

Private Information, Credit Risk and Graph Structure in P2P Lending Networks

This research investigated the potential for improving Peer-to-Peer (P2P) credit scoring by using “private information” about communications and travels of borrowers. We found that P2P borrowers’ ego networks exhibit scale-free behavior driven by underlying preferential attachment mechanisms that connect borrowers in a fashion that can be used to predict loan profitability. The projection of th...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009