The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intrafirm Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a matching and intra rm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production and matching technologies, large rms hire and train workers e¢ciently. The e¢ciency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large rm to take into account the consequences of training on the wages bargained inside the rm. This intra rm bargaining process solves the hold-up problem that is associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to ine¢cient decisions of hiring and training. Keywords: Training; Matching; Bargaining; E¢ciency JEL Classi cation: J24; J31; C78
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