A Logic of Intentions and Beliefs yzMunindar

Intentions are an important concept in Artiicial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. We present a formal theory of intentions and beliefs based on Discourse Representation Theory that captures many of their important logical properties. Unlike possible worlds approaches, this theory does not assume that agents are perfect reasoners, and gives a realistic view of their internal architecture; unlike most representational approaches, it has an objective semantics, and does not rely on an ad hoc labeling of the internal states of agents. We describe a minimal logic for intentions and beliefs that is sound and complete relative to our semantics. We discuss several additional axioms, and the constraints on the models that validate them. This is a considerably extended and revised version of a paper entitled \Towards a Formal Theory of Intentions" that appears in the proceedings of the European Workshop on Logic in AI. y We are indebted to Allen Emerson and Rob Koons and to two anonymous referees for comments.