The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. JEL classification number: C71, C72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games
دوره 1 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010