Potential, coalition formation and coalition structure∗
نویسنده
چکیده
The present paper studies a new potential function of a cooperative game with a coalition structure. When define a marginal contribution of each player, a notion of a coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983) is considered. Our potential is a real-valued function in contrast to Winter (1992)’s one which is vector-valued function whose dimension is the number of elements in the coalition structure. As well as Hart and MasColell (1989)’s approach, a marginal contribution of our function leads to a new solution concept. The solution concept is closely related to the weighted Shapley value and its weight is endogenously determined by the solution. In addition to the axiomatization by the usual additivity approach, it is characterized by the similar property to the balanced contributions of the Shapley value (Myerson (1980)). JEL classification codes: C71
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