Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
نویسندگان
چکیده
While both public and private financial agencies supply asset markets with large amounts of information, they do not generally disclose all assetrelated information to the general public. This observation leads us to ask what principles might govern the optimal disclosure policy for an asset manager or financial regulator. To investigate this question, we study the properties of a dynamic economy endowed with a risky asset, and with individuals that lack commitment. Information relating to future asset returns is available to society at zero cost. Legislation dictates whether this information is to be made public or not. Given the properties of our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable. This result is overturned, however, when individuals are able to access hidden information—what we call undue diligence—at sufficiently low cost. Information disclosure is desirable, in other words, only to the extent that individuals can easily discover it for themselves. ∗The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Andolfatto: Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, P.O. Box 442 St. Louis, MO 63166-0442 (email [email protected]). Berentsen: Economics Department, University of Basel, Peter-Merian-Weg 6, Postfach, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland (email [email protected]). Waller: Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, P.O. Box 442 St. Louis, MO 63166-0442 (email [email protected]). For comments on earlier versions of this paper we thank Stephen Cecchetti, Leonardo Gambacorta, Jacob Gyntelberg, David Levine, Georg Noeldecke, Guillaume Rocheteau, Christian Upper, Randall Wright and participants in seminars or conferences at Banque de France, Bank for International Settlements, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Mannheim, St. Gallen, IHS Vienna, the Society for Economic Dynamics. Andolfatto acknowledges the financial support of SSHRC. Berentsen acknowledges support by the Bank for International Settlements (the usual disclaimer applies).
منابع مشابه
Optimal Policy for Software Vulnerability Disclosure
Disclosing vulnerabilities in a timely fashion is a real and ever more important policy question. Late disclosure reduces the time window that customers are exposed to attacks, but decreases vendor’s willingness to deliver quick patch. Currently, there is little or no guidance with each organization following it own ad-hoc policy. This paper is to demonstrate how through optimal timing of discl...
متن کاملThe Role of Information Disclosure in Climate Mitigation Policy
Information disclosure policies represent an additional policy mechanism that can be used to foster reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. These informational efforts could be either mandatory or voluntary, but in each case government regulation could play a productive role by establishing common structures for the information and providing criteria to ensure the accuracy and credibility of th...
متن کاملInvestment Adviser Due Diligence Processes for Selecting Alternative Investments and Their Respective Managers
For at least the past six years, staff in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (the “staff” and “OCIE” respectively) have observed and outside studies have indicated that investment advisers, including pension consultants, are increasingly recommending alternative investments to their clients. Investment advisers are fiduciaries and thus must act in their clients’ best interest...
متن کاملOptimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions∗
This paper studies optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks which determine the efficient level of output and the firms’ desired mark-up. To minimize the welfare-reducing output gap and price dispersion among the firms, the central bank controls the firms’ incentives an...
متن کاملTHE KASKY-NIKE THREAT TO CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTING Implementing a Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution
PSstract: In the recent case of Nike v. Kasky both sides argued that their standard for distinguishing commercial speech from political speech would create the better policy for ensuring accurate and complete disclosure of social information by corporations. Using insights from information economics, we argue that neither standard will achieve the policy goal of optimal truthful disclosure. Ins...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 149 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014