PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ ALTER: DOES SYNESTHESIA UNDERMINE REPRESENTATIONALISM? 1 Does Synesthesia Undermine Representationalism?

On Gregg Rosenberg’s (2004) view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. I explain how the representationalist can answer his arguments. The belief that synesthesia poses a serious problem for representationalism derives, I argue, from misconceptions about representationalism. Rosenberg’s discussion of synesthesia and representationalism forms part of his defense of panexperientialism. His concern is that on panexperientialism there might be “protoconscious” experiences that don’t represent anything because they aren’t associated with cognitive systems. However, I argue, it is unclear that, given panexperientialism, association with a cognitive system is required for representation.