EPIC Mechanisms and VCG
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VCG Redistribution with Gross Substitutes
For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents’ utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible ...
متن کاملWorst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. For resource allocation problems, the well-known VCG mechanism satisfies a list of desired properties, including efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the non-deficit property. However, VCG is generally not budget-balanced. Under VCG, agents pay the VCG payments, wh...
متن کاملTruthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems
In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey[1961]-Clarke[1971]Groves[1973] (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utilities are not quasi-linear. We provide a generalization of utilitarian problems, termed consistent problems, and prove that every consistent problem admits a truthful mechanism. These mechanisms, termed VC...
متن کاملVCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms
In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. Iterative auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical settings, since they can avoid full revelation of type information. However, to guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, the mechanism needs to achieve exactly the same outcome as the...
متن کاملLimits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects
A natural goal in designing mechanisms for auctions and public projects is to maximize the social welfare while incentivizing players to bid truthfully. If these are the only concerns, the problem is easily solved by use of the VCG mechanism. Unfortunately, this mechanism is not computationally efficient in general and there are currently no other general methods for designing truthful mechanis...
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