Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops

Much of the merchandise produced by U.S. companies and sold to U.S. consumers is manufactured by workers in third world countries who earn as little as 12 cents per hour drudging away in harsh and even dangerous work environments. Such workplaces are referred to as sweatshops and are especially common in the apparel and shoe industries and in toy making. Many critics object to sweatshops on the grounds that they harm the workers or violate basic human rights. These moral objections are aimed at certain sweatshop practices such as coercion, unsafe working conditions, deception, paying workers less than promised, etc. These practices are not seriously defended by many people, if any. But the “sweatshop” label can still apply to jobs that do not involve any of these more obvious moral atrocities. A difficult job with long hours that pays very little may still be referred to as a sweatshop job and, I will argue, may still be morally objectionable. The question I want to consider is whether it is morally justifiable to pay the very low sweatshop wages for the very arduous sweatshop labor even if there is no coercion, deception, or direct causing of harm. Some defenders of capitalism and supporters of free-market economics have defended sweatshop wages on the grounds that they benefit the desperately poor workers of these impoverished countries who are very glad to get the work. In an important and widely reprinted paper, Ian Maitland argues that “the appropriate test [for fair wages] is not whether the wage reaches some predetermined standard but whether it is freely accepted by (reasonably) informed workers.” In this paper I will criticize the defense, as well as the practice, of (excessively low) sweatshop wages. In particular I will challenge the claim that one cannot wrong someone by benefiting her, especially if she consents to (and prefers to receive) such treatment. In order to avoid some obvious objections to the thesis that I am defending it is important to distinguish my position from other less plausible positions. I am not arguing that it is morally wrong to hire poor workers in third world countries. This position is more reminiscent of the kind of protectionism that motivated the “Always Buy American” campaign of the 1980s than the contemporary anti-sweatshop movement. Also, I am not arguing that workers in poor countries should get paid the same as workers in wealthy industrialized countries. This position is not only unrealistic but would have the same outcome as the protectionist movement. Paying workers in faraway places the same as workers make at home would generally cost more money and so such a requirement would result in fewer if any jobs for poor countries, and thus would actually harm those workers who would be denied a