Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies
نویسنده
چکیده
Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter’s [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with typedependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48–69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C62; C72; C65
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 146 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011