Bidders ’ Strategy for Multi - Attribute Sequential English Auction with a Deadline 1 “ Student paper ”
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we consider a procurement multi-attribute English auction with a deadline. This protocol can be used for agents who try to reach an agreement on an item or issue, which is characterized by several quality attributes in addition to the price. The protocol allows the specification of a deadline since in many real world situations it is essential to conclude a negotiation among agents and to reach an agreement under a strict deadline. Currently, the deadline rules, which are mainly used for auction mechanisms, result in an non-recommended and unstable bidding strategy, , i.e. the last minute bidding strategy, causing system overhead and inefficient auction outcomes. Therefore, we define another deadline rule which diminishes the phenomenon of lastminute bidding-strategy and thus prevents bottlenecks in the agents' network. We analyzed simultaneous and sequential multiattribute English auctions with a fixed deadline that can be used for negotiating agents. For each of these protocols combined with the deadline rule, we provide the bidders automated agent with the optimal and stable bidding strategy. Categories & Subject Descriptors Intelligent agents, Multiagent systems. General Terms
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