A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom. JEL Classification, C72, C78. ∗We thank Marco Mariotti, two anonymous referees and an associate editor for helpful comments. †Nir Dagan, Academic Priority Ltd., www.nirdagan.com. Email: [email protected]. ‡Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Web site: http://volij.co.il. Email: [email protected]. §Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Web site: http:// www.ma.huji.ac.il/ ̃ eyalw/. Email: [email protected].
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 19 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002