Notes for “ Decentralized College Admissions ” Yeon - Koo Che and Youngwoo Koh
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چکیده
Before proceeding, we make the following observations: First, for each student, applying to a college dominates not applying at all. Second, since a student does not know the score and the student’s preference is independent of the score, the student’s application depends solely on the preference. Third, since each student’s preference depends on the state, the mass of students applying to each college varies across states. Let ni(s) be the mass of students who apply to college i = A,B in state s.
منابع مشابه
Decentralized College Admissions
We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students’ attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on...
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where the the last inequality holds since mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1. Note that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without exceeding its capacity. Similarly, if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting mA(0) − κ of students. Thus, we must have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Step 2. In equilibrium, there is a unique ŝi ∈ (0, 1), for i = A,B, such that mi(ŝi) = κ. Proof...
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