Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games

نویسندگان

  • Patricia Bouyer
  • Romain Brenguier
  • Nicolas Markey
  • Michael Ummels
چکیده

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turnbased game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single ω-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several ω-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Logical Methods in Computer Science

دوره 11  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015