The skeptical paradox and the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs

Recently the following understanding of epistemological skepticism has become widely accepted: skepticism about our knowledge of the world is not a thesis to be accepted or refuted; the philosophical problem skepticism presents is nothing but a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments for skepticism. Call this the paradox view of skepticism. The paradox view is certainly appealing, for it is difficult to imagine that any of us would seriously consider accepting skepticism even given the force of its arguments. Although this does not mean that it is a way of seeing skepticism that is in no need of justification, those who see skepticism this way usually do not try to justify their view. In this paper I will first explain why justification of the paradox view is required, and suggest that the best justification we can have is by showing that knowledge-beliefs, i.e. beliefs that we know this or that about the world, are indispensable to us. I will then argue in the remainder of this paper for the indispensability thesis.