How Rent Seeking Can Promote Efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
If government offers a prize to firms, each may likely lobby to be the beneficiary. The heavy lobbying may signal to government that the prize is too large, inducing government to cancel the policy. ∗Professor of Economics, University of California–Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697. E-mail: [email protected]. Telephone: 949-824-5974.
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