Workers’ Enterprises Are Not Perverse: Differential Oligopoly Games with Sticky Price
نویسندگان
چکیده
We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the openloop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (1987) in a static framework. JEL Classification: C73, D92, L13
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