Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when "playing" for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected.
منابع مشابه
Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation
We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance coo...
متن کاملBuilding Rational Cooperation On Their Own: Learning to Start Small
We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are willing to cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the ...
متن کاملA One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma with Procedural Utility
This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payo¤s. It applies the model to the Prisoners’ Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium....
متن کاملRobustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated and Dynamic Games
This paper extends Kajii and Morris (1997)’s notion of robustness to incomplete information to repeated and more generally dynamic games. We argue that in dynamic games, the requirements of robustness should be strengthened to allow for small payoff deviations with large probability. Under this strengthening, we show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized by applying a one-shot...
متن کاملSkeptical Reciprocity and Principled Defection
Cooperating with others often entails some sacrifice of one's own material interests. Many theories of reciprocity and cooperation thus assert a social-material tradeoff. In these theories, people reciprocate cooperation when they prioritize how they treat others and how others treat them. They do not reciprocate cooperation when they prioritize their own material well-being. We challenge this ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره 7 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012