Repeated Games

نویسندگان

  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Sylvain Sorin
  • Shmuel Zamir
چکیده

I Basic Results on Normal Form Games 3 I.1 The Minmax Theorem 4 I.1.a Definitions and Notations 4 I.1.b A Basic Theorem 5 I.1.c Convexity 6 I.1.d Mixed Strategies 6 I.1.e Note on the Separation Theorem 9 Exercises 10 I.2 Complements to the Minmax Theorem 15 I.2.a The Topology on S 16 I.2.b Lack of Continuity: Regularization 16 I.2.c Lack of Compactness: Approximation 19 I.2.d Measurability: Symmetric Case 20 I.2.e Pure Optimal Strategies 23 Exercises 24 I.3 The Minmax Theorem for Ordered Fields 31 Exercises 32 I.4 Equilibrium Points 45 Exercises 45

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تاریخ انتشار 2000