On the Teaching of Virtue in Plato’s Meno and the Nature of Philosophical Authority

Socrates and Meno reach two different conclusions: in the first part of the dialogue, that virtue is knowledge and can therefore be taught; in the second, that it is reliable true opinion and can therefore be acquired only by divine inspiration. Taking into account Socrates’ role as a teacher (of his interlocutors and of Plato) and Plato’s role as a teacher (of us), I show that neither of these conclusions is consistent with the existence of philosophy as a human institution, and argue that, for this reason, Plato refuses ultimately to endorse either of them. Meno’s question — “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is something teachable?” (701–2) — is important for the obvious reason that it concerns what we must do: if there is some way of acquiring virtue, then we are obliged to acquire it. But it has further implications, as well, both for political philosophy and for philosophical politics: that is, the political structure of philosophy itself. It is therefore worth understanding how Plato answers it, or fails to, in the course of the dialogue. Much discussion of the Meno has focused on epistemological issues, and on the passages in which Socrates explains his theory of learning as recollection. Given the confusing nature of those passages, it is no surprise that many competing interpretations have emerged. I do have ideas about how (and to what Parenthetical references to Plato’s works are to Platonis Opera, 5 vols., Oxford Classical Texts (1902–1913), and unless otherwise indicated to the Meno (in vol. 3, ed. John Burnet). Translations are my own. There is a vast literature (of the kind we call “secondary”) on Plato in general, on this dialogue in particular. I unfortunately do not have space here for a proper discussion of it, though I will sometimes mention other authors below for one reason or another. Some recent interpretations usefully compared to mine are: Rosemary Desjardins, “Knowledge and Virtue: Paradox in Plato’s Meno,” Review of Metaphysics 39 (1985): 261–81; Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern