The functional role of emotions in aesthetic judgment

نویسندگان

  • Ioannis Xenakis
  • Argyris Arnellos
  • John Darzentas
چکیده

Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation –mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions – concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function of heuristic learning; and Aesthetic Appraisal Subsystem (AAS) which primarily affects the elicitation of aesthetic emotional meanings. These two subsystems (CVS and AAS) are organizationally connected and affect the action readiness of the autonomous agent.More specifically,we consider the emotional outcome of these two subsystems as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty that emerges in the particular interaction. 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Emotion as a fundamental aspect of any cognitive function Most theories on emotions attribute a central place to their functional role in cognitive processes and their affect on behavior. A cognitive agent, in an attempt to increase its autonomy, tries always to advance the complexity of the functions it uses in order to be able to serve itsfinal decisions. According to those theories, emotional activity functions as amonitoringmechanismor a feedback system that regulates the effectiveness of the potential or chosen interaction. As such, emotions are bound by agent’s goals and the respective biological needs, but they are also highly related to the behavior of an agent (Brehm,Miron, &Miller, 2009; Cupchik, 2001;Nelissen, Dijker, & deVries, 2007; Rasmussen,Wrosch, Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Schwarz, 2000). In this paper our aim is to defend a model of minimal functionality of emotions, where the latter are also related to minimal [email protected] . All rights reserved. aesthetic decisions and judgments. It should be noted that thewhole development of aesthetic judgment ismuchmore complex than this minimal relation of a primary function of emotions that directly affect agent’s behavior. Although emotions can occasionally have such direct effects, in a higher level of the conscious, emotions operatemainly and most efficiently by means of their influence on cognitive processes, which in turn function as input into decision and behavior regulation processes (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Damasio, 2000b). However, in this paper, we do not stay in the debate between affect and emotion and their qualitative differentiations, but we consider emotions as a reached outcome of an appraisal process that also benefits from the range and variety of the conscious, providing much more qualitative information than a simple feeling that something is probably good or bad, that should be approached or avoided, etc. Emotions play a major role in decision making and thus they serve important cognitive functions (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Pieters, 1998; Frijda & Swagerman, 1987; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1987; Leone, Perugini, & Bagozzi, 2005; Schwarz, 2000). Emotions are functions that detect opportunities and threats, the existence or not of a solution I. Xenakis et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 212–226 213 and, roughly, they answer to what the system should do in a given interaction. Additionally, they signal the outcomes of the respective appraisal processes to the other functions that control the actions and plans of the cognitive agent. Emotions are implicitly associated to the representations and, in general, to the transformation of the factual knowledge of a cognitive agent. According to Bagozzi et al. (1998), “emotions function to produce action in a way promoting the achievement of goals” (Bagozzi et al., 1998, p. 2). The relationship between emotions and goals are neither automatic nor direct. Emotions emerge from the prospects for goal success or failure and their intensity is a crucial aspect that influences the potential motivation to pursue that goal. According to Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1987), emotions are a “part of a management system to co-ordinate each individual’s multiple plans and goals under constraints of time and other limited resources” (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1987, p. 31). Carver (2001) suggests that positive and negative emotions provide the system with information that is functionally useful for the evaluation of the current condition according to the system’s motives and goals. Hence, emotional activity plays twomajor roles; firstly, it notifies the agent to move towards the incentives and away from threats and secondly, through the feedback system, it compares and rates signals that correspond to the progress that the cognitive agent is making against a reference rate. It is the error signal of these processes that is manifested as an emotion. If the rate of the signal is either too low or too high, it produces correspondingly a negative or positive affect. In the case of an acceptable rate, no value occurs as an immediate result of the evaluation of the signal. In other words, emotions with a positive value (euphoric) are associated with the attainment of a goal, leading to decisions that allow a cognitive agent to continue with its current plan. In contrast, emotions with negative value (dysphoric) emerge when the cognitive agent has problems with the ongoing plans and fails to achieve the desired goals. Those positive and negative values lead to problem-solving mechanisms which reconsider the existing goal structures in order to reconstruct new plans (Bagozzi et al., 1998). In general, the cognitive agent evokes or/and adopts an emotion at a significant juncture of its action plan, when there is a change in the conscious or/and the unconscious evaluation of the possible success of a plan (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1987). According to Pugh (1979) and from a theoretical decision-theory perspective, emotions must be classified as values. Specifically, Pugh states that “They are valuative (i.e., scalar) quantities that are associatedwith “outcomes” for the purpose of guiding a decision process” (Pugh, 1979, p. 61). Moreover, it seems that there is a strong relation between memory and emotions. Memories from past emotional experiences allow the cognitive agent to navigate between complex webs of choices. Whether an agent seeks out or avoids specific experiences is partly determined by its memories, and specifically, by how pleasant or unpleasant have similar experiences affected the agent in the past. They generally tend to recall emotional states that are congruent rather than incongruent with their current feelings. Moreover, a cognitive agent is motivated to anticipate positive versus negative stimuli. All decisions of an agent involve predictions of future emotions that are anticipated to bemore positively valued than those that the agent is already experiencing (Lench & Levine, 2010; Schwarz, 2000). According to Baumeister et al. (2007), cognitive agents learn to anticipate emotional outcomes andbehave soas to pursue the emotions they prefer. Additionally, according to Schmidt, Patnaik, and Kensinger (2011), although it is evident that emotion can enhance the ability to remember that a specific event has occurred, thememory of that event often involvesmore than simply remembering its occurrence. This memory includes notonly the “what”but also the “where” and the “when”of the respective experience (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). Agents respond to objects and make judgments about them, according to their emotional states which arise from their interaction with them (Schwarz, 2000). Generally, a positive or a negative emotion, such as pleasure or pain, plays a major role in the survival of an agent. Pleasure and pain are not properties of the environment. Our brain generates pleasant or unpleasant emotions in response to those aspects of the environment that were respectively a consistent benefit or threat to gene survival (Johnston, 2003). Emotional functions lead individuals to avoid situations that will be harmful to their stability. Johnston (2003) suggests an alternative context that will help us understand the functional role of emotions. He actually states that: ". if sensations are considered to be properties that exist in the external world then conscious experiences are reduced to nonfunctional epiphenomena. But if the external world is viewed as pitch dark, silent, tasteless, and odorless, then our evolved sensations acquire awholenew function” (Johnston, 2003, p.174). In otherwords, the results of an observation do not refer directly to objects in the external world, but instead, they are the results of recurrent cognitive functions in the structural coupling between the cognitive agent and the environment (Arnellos, Spyrou, & Darzentas, 2010). In this evolutionary perspective, the relation between the emergent conscious experiences and gene survival has already been established by natural selection. In the naturalized perspective of the interactivist model, as introduced by Bickhard (2000a, 2009a), the cognitive agent, in its interactive flow, is continuously prepared for further interactive processes, and at the same time, he has the ability to detect when those preparations will fail to be prepared for the actual course of interaction. Learning introduces variation, when things are not going well or stability, when they are proceeding according to the anticipation of the preparation process. Although these preparations constitute the indications of interactive potentiality they would not support clear and dynamically well-organized anticipations of such potentiality. Learning is the only process that could probably regulate the effectiveness of such uncertainty. However, the cognitive agent could develop ways of dealing with several uncertain situations, which are not always identical to situations that the system usually interacts with. In such cases, and according to Bickhard, positive andnegative emotions are arousedwhen the cognitive agent tries to resolve this interactive uncertainty. A positive emotion is elicited from a simple mode of successful interaction, when there is a strong anticipation for the resolution of a particular uncertainty, and where the respective interaction results in the elimination of that uncertainty. Correspondingly, the interaction that results in greater I. Xenakis et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 212–226 214 uncertainty regarding the way of dealing with a particular uncertain situation will yield a negative emotion. Thus, for Bickhard, dynamic uncertainty with a graded anticipation of resolution is the model for emotions. 1.1. Emotions of pleasure and aesthetic judgment From another perspective, aesthetic theory has proposed that basic emotional states of pleasure and pain play a main functional role in the formation of agent’s aesthetic judgment (Guyer, 2003, 2008; Matravers & Levinson, 2005a, 2005b; Ginsborg, 2003; Iseminger, 2003; Matravers, 2003; Cupchik, 1995; Kant, 1914). Kant’s (2002) Critique of the power of judgment has many admirers and has influenced practically every study, philosophical or not, which attempts to explain the aesthetic experience, aesthetic judgment and beauty. For Kant, aesthetic judgments can be either sensory or reflecting. Sensory aesthetic judgments are based on our feelings and reflecting aesthetic judgments are judgments of beauty and judgments of the sublime (Wicks, 2007). Specifically when the agent reflects on an object or an action, such reflection leads to a judgment of beauty when the agent’s two faculties, imagination and understanding, are brought into harmony with one another. This free play of the two faculties elicits a disinterested feeling of pleasure, disinterested because the emotional outcome is disconnected from any desire or purpose for the object or for what it may represent (Cannon, 2008). An object is beautiful (or pleases the senses) only when it is represented by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. According to Kant, disinterestedness is a basic criterion for an aesthetic judgment. The emotional factor seems so strong in aesthetic experience that it leaves no room for any cognitive, and thus no logical, judgment. Every interest, Kant claims, spoils the judgment of taste and as such every judgment of taste cannot be determined by any representation of an objective purpose. For Kant, when representations are related to feelings of pleasure or displeasure, judgments are subjective and they relate entirely to the agent’s personal feelings of the self through such emotional experiences. This emotional activity “grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging that contributes nothing to cognition but only holds the given representation in the subject up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state” (Kant, 2002, p. 90). The second aesthetic concept, which is also related with reflecting aesthetic judgments, is the sublime. The ground of the sublime is also in the agent’s mind and it is also characterized by dissatisfaction. Beauty, according to Kant (2002), is about representations of perceivable forms of actual objects, and sublimity is about representations of ideas of reason, which cannot be contained in any perceivable form. However, in the Kantian approach, what constitutes the feeling of pleasure in the context of judgment is phenomenologically opaque (Cannon, 2008) and the inner process that produces those aesthetic feelings is still unchallenged. Additionally, the problem of intentionality in aesthetic experience raises several philosophical questions about Kant’s claim for disinterestedness in aesthetic experience discouraging a serious consideration of his theory (Allison, 2001; Guyer, 1978; Lorand, 1994; Weber & Valera, 2002). The whole development of Kant’s Critique of the power of Judgement is about teleological explanations that touch intrinsic and not relative purposiveness in the cognitive agent’s actions (Weber & Valera, 2002) as the modern understanding of complex systems demands. Our aim in this paper is to explore the functional significance of aesthetic emotions apart from those philosophical explanations and abstract philosophical terms like beauty, sublime, imagination etc. As Weber and Valera (2002) claim, those teleological descriptions can be possibly naturalized only by accepting that “organisms are subjects having purposes according to values encountered in the making of their living” (Weber & Valera, 2002, p. 102). In other words, there is a great necessity for explanations based on the naturalized concept of normative functionality in order to illuminate the mystery of aesthetic behavior. Therefore, in this paper, we suggest a minimal model of aesthetic judgment proposing a systemically and organizationally causal connection between aesthetic judgment and the respective emotional values (positive or negative, i.e. pleasure or pain), as these emerge through the interaction of the cognitive agent with its environment. In the suggested model, aesthetic emotions are considered as functions that serve an evaluation mechanism, as the cognitive agent tries to resolve the interactive uncertainty in a given interaction. As such aesthetics for the proposed model are an amalgam of intentional cognitive and emotional processes that function in order to evaluate agent’s interactive potentialities. Our aim in this paper is to defend a naturalized explanation about the process by which the elicitation of basic aesthetic emotions of pleasure and pain affect the development of the aesthetic judgment. Moreover, the construction of the proposed model cannot be based on etiological descriptions that are usually offered in literature when studies tend to measure the phenomenon of aesthetic experience. Etiological models are not adequate in capturing the naturalistic emergence of functions and of their respective representations. In general, they are causally epiphenomenal, hence, naturalism fails (Bickhard, 2004). Particularly, as Johnston notes about the causal functional role of emotions: “.natural selection “cannot see” such internal subjective feelings, but it can see their causal consequences. The downward causation of emergent properties is real and indisputable. .our emergent feelings appear to play a causal role in learning and reasoning.” (Johnston, 2003, p. 175). On the contrary, naturalization requires the justification of an explanation based on facts, i.e. based on natural relations and interactions. It is primarily an attempt to look inside the system under consideration and try to understand and explain how it works. This seems to be the most valid strategy for naturalism, as in this case the respective explanations can be objectively verified. Lately, there is a strong emphasis on the fact that autonomy holds the I. Xenakis et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 212–226 215 primary role in the establishment of a naturalistic framework for the analysis, explanation and modeling of the emergence and further development of meaning in a cognitive system the emergence and development of autonomous agents (Arnellos et al., 2010; Bickhard, 2000b; Collier, 1999; Moreno, Etxeberria, & Umerez, 2008; RuizMirazo & Moreno, 2000). Therefore, in order to construct a naturalized explanation, which strengthens the functional role of emotions in aesthetic judgment,1 we suggest that a naturalistic and interactive model of representation and motivation in autonomous agents should be used as a canvas to model the elicitation of aesthetic emotions. We need a dynamic interactive model that considers living autonomous systems as complex, dynamic, open systems with multiple emergent properties, such as representation, motivation, learning and emotions. The important aspects of this model, which are also relevant to our goal, are described in detail in Section 2. Additionally in Section 3 we attempt to combine findings from the field of neurology regarding the complex process of aesthetic experience with the interactive model of representation, providing a deeper understanding of the mental processes that lead to aesthetic meaning. Finally in Section 4 using appraisal theory of emotions as a vehicle we suggest a functional model which attempts a better description of the development, the dynamic relation and the role of the emotional activity in the whole formation of aesthetic meaning and judgment. 2. Action selection in (living) autonomous agents As previously stated, emotional activity plays a major role in the agent’s decisions in a given interaction. However, an interactive model which explains the normative phenomena emerging during the (inter)action selection will be needed. This model could be used as a canvas in order to explore the functional role of emotions in aesthetic decisions. The interactivist model, as introduced by Bickhard (2000a, 2009a), provides the right functionality for this purpose. In this section, we briefly describe the main features of this model such as emergent representation, motivation, and learning, which are current in the interactive system ontology. Every autonomous agent interacts continuously with the environment in order to determine the appropriate conditions for the success of its functional processes (Arnellos et al., 2010). This illustrates a fundamental fact about autonomous systems: they are open to their environments as a matter of their ontological necessity (Bickhard, 2004), which means, given the need for selfmaintenance, an agent has access to functional inner 1 Aesthetic judgment is a higher-order agential activity combining several cognitive and emotional processes in which the cognitive agent should engage in order to accomplish the ideally ultimate aesthetic verdict. In this paper aesthetic judgment depicts fundamental emotional tensions, decisions and preferences of the agent in the interaction process. Those fundamental emotional actions are closer to what we mean by the notion of aesthetic preference. However, we will keep the term ‘aesthetic judgment’ for purposes of compatibility with the cognitive and philosophical approaches in the current literature of aesthetics. systems that enable him to represent the environmental conditions and detect for possible failures of those conditions. This is functionally useful to the agent in order to serve its primary goal, i.e. to maintain its autonomy in the course of interactions. Specifically, an autonomous agent needs to exhibit a kind of functionality that will at least maintain and enhance its autonomy. This requires conditions of process and interaction closure such as the ones in which functional meaning emerges by selecting the function that will achieve closurewhile the agent interacts with the environment. This implies a conceptual as well as a practical interdependence between autonomy, functionality, intentionality and meaning (see Collier, 1999 and Arnellos et al., 2010, for extended explanations), but it does not, in any way, imply that the goal of self-maintenance should be explicitly represented in the autonomous agent. Bickhard (1997a) argues that such an autonomous system should have a way to differentiate between environmental conditions, and should enable a switching mechanism in order to choose among the appropriate internal functional processes that it will use in a given interaction. Such differentiations functionally indicate that some type of interaction is available in the specific environment and hence, they implicitly presuppose that the environment exhibits the appropriate conditions for the success of the indicated interaction (Arnellos et al., 2010). As such, these differentiations are the basis for setting up indications of further interactive potentialities (Bickhard, 2004). According to Bickhard, all those conditions that are internal or external to the agent constitute the dynamic presuppositions of interaction. Dynamic presuppositions can be true or false and the interaction will succeed or fail, respectively (Bickhard, 2003, 2004). These differentiated indications constitute emergent representations and the complex web of those indications can form the representations of such objects. These presuppositions constitute the representational content of the agent with respect to the differentiated environment (Arnellos et al., 2010). Through this process of dynamic representation the agent is able to carry out the fundamental actions of distinction and observation. In other words the cognitive agent has evolved a capacity to make distinctions based on historically evolved habits and actions according to his dynamic architecture and organization. Moreover, the agent has the ability to detect all those distinctions thus providing a feedback for his progress in the course of interaction (Hoffmeyer, 1998; Pugh, 1979). The process of detection refers to observation by means that the cognitive agent integrates itself into its own self-maintaining loop. From the cognitive agent’s perspective, only actions which feed back to the agent’s sensor systems can be detected. The agent cannot observe any other action, which simply disappears in the environment. Thus, as Porr andWörgötter (2005) claim, “there is no other chance for the organism as to analyze its inputs, as this is the only aspect that the organism is able to observe. Even its own actions are only observable through its inputs” (Porr &Wörgötter, 2005, p.109). Hence, and in that way, the cognitive agent itself has the ability to observe its own boundaries in a self-referential loop in which it refers back to himself the result of its own actions. This makes the 2 The limbic system is a complex structure of nerves and networks in the brain, involving several areas near the edge of the cortex concerned with instinct and mood. This area of the brain is intricately involved in motivation and basic emotions like fear, pleasure, or anger and drives hunger, sex, dominance, care of offspring. Also the limbic system receives incoming sensory stimulation (sights, smells, tastes) that activate rather automatic emotional reactions. (Fellous, Armony, & LeDoux, 2003; Reeve, 2008). However, the limbic system anatomical concept and the limbic system theory of emotion are both problematic (LeDoux, 2000). I. Xenakis et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 212–226 216 agent a self-referential system, providing him with the ability to create new distinctions (actions) based on previous ones, to judge its distinctions, and to increase its complexity by creating new meanings in order to interact (Arnellos, Spyrou, & Darzentas, 2007). Summarizing, in general, a cognitive agent should have the requisite variety (e.g. an adaptive anticipatory system that acts before learning) to react against the signal, which initiates a deviation from the desired state in its feedback system and learn forward models of its own reflex-loops (Porr & Wörgötter, 2005). If representation is a fundamental aspect of an interactive system ontology, then another equally important aspect of the same ontology is motivation. Living systems, however, as far-from-equilibrium and self-referential systems must always be in interaction with their environment in order to maintain their far-from-equilibrium conditions. According to Bickhard’s claim, the major question concerning the significance of motivation must be: ‘what makes an organism do one thing rather than another in the course of further interactive activity?’ (Bickhard, 2000a, 2003; Reeve, 2008). This is the problem of interaction selection. Motivation is responsible for the function of selecting the processes and representation is responsible for the anticipation in the service of such selection. Both representation and motivation are aspects of a more fundamental form of process in certain far-fromequilibrium systems (Bickhard, 2003). Learning and development is another fundamental aspect of choosing the appropriate interaction with respect to the current condition of the agent. Learning is a constructive process which introduces destabilization when the system fails to anticipate or stability when the system acts according to the set up of the next interactive process, which means that anticipation is successful. An autonomous system tends to stabilize on interaction process and proceed successfully according to its anticipation and to its goals. According to Bickhard and Campbell (1996), learning has a heuristic character in which the system can profit from past successes and failures. The successful outcome of a previous interaction will be functionally useful in an attempt of solving a new problem. This process presupposes a location where the old problem representations and solutions are stored and some way for the system to be able to locate these and/or the adjacent ones which may probably be useful to manage the representations of the new problem. Such a configuration of information constitutes a topology. Therefore, heuristic learning and development require functional topologies, as well as the ability to construct new topologies. Summarizing, any complex autonomous agent needs to solve the problem of choosing the appropriate action. Action selection is the fundamental problem of what the agent must do in its next steps. Many potential interactions can be indicated in association with the internal outcomes of those interactions. All those internal outcomes pertaining to what can be expected by the cognitive agent play a major role in interaction selection. Representation emerged naturally in the evolution of interactive systems as a solution to the problem of interaction selection and as such, it functions as an aspect of indicating further interactive potentialities. The indication of an interactive potentiality will be conditional on system’s motives and on all those outcomes of particular prior interactions (Bickhard, 2000a). Those functions provide the systemwith the appropriate conditions in order to anticipate its future courses of interaction. In general “an interactive systemwill be continuously interacting and continuously preparing itself for further interaction on the basis of prior interactive flow” (Bickhard, 2000a, p. 2) (see Scheme 1). The next section is a first step to combine the findings of the neurological perspective regarding the complex process of aesthetic experience with the interactive model of representation. In this combination, we focus on the process of aesthetic meaning. Particularly, aiming at a naturalized model of the elicitation of aesthetic emotions, the neurological evidences that are considered to be in accordance with Bickhard’s interactive model of representation will offer a better understanding about the functions that take place in the formation of aesthetic judgment (meaning/preference). 3. Aesthetic meaning: a neurological perspective 3.1. Neurological explanations regarding the aesthetic

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تاریخ انتشار 2011