Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions
نویسنده
چکیده
We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (2001), and using methods of Imai (1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, 1988), by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem. JEL-Classification: C78, D60, D70
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016