Computing Weakest Strategies for Safety Games of Imperfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
CEDAR (Counter Example Driven Antichain Refinement) is a new symbolic algorithm for computing weakest strategies for safety games of imperfect information. The algorithm computes a fixed point over the lattice of contravariant antichains. Here contravariant antichains are antichains over pairs consisting of an information set and an allow set representing the associated move. We demonstrate how the richer structure of contravariant antichains for representing antitone functions, as opposed to standard antichains for representing sets of downward closed sets, allows CEDAR to apply a significantly less complex controllable predecessor step than previous algorithms.
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