No-regret dynamics and fictitious play
نویسندگان
چکیده
Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 148 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013