New Trading Evaluation Mechanism on Incentive Design

نویسندگان

  • Tokuro Matsuo
  • Koki Murakata
  • Satoshi Takahashi
چکیده

This paper shows the effects of traders evaluation based computational mechanism design in electronic commerce. The proposes a new user evaluation methods based on multi-criteria based rating system. In the existing trading systems, most of them have user evaluation to help buyers/sellers decision making to trade. However, a user can never know where the potential trading partners did trade successfully based on his/her evaluation criteria. And also, some traders show the information, which are advantage on their trade on the ecommerce website. In some cases, sellers lose a chance to sell the item because of lack of their and their items information. Contrary, buyers sometimes cannot make a decision to choose trading partner because of poor webpage structure even though the seller is truthful trader. To solve these problems, we propose a new evaluation system based on multi-criteria evaluation and sellers trading history. We show 6 experiment results using our proposed mechanism the rest of paper.

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تاریخ انتشار 2014